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Does the EU help or hinder gay rights movements in post-communist Europe? Conor O’Dwyer assesses
the impact of EU intervention in the case of gay rights in Poland. He argues that Europeanisation
perspectives, in which a country’s policies are assumed to be shaped before and during accession
by EU conditionality, offer a fairly poor account of how gay rights have developed in the Polish case.
Rather, Poland experienced an immediate backlash against EU pressure over the issue, which
polarised opinions and indirectly strengthened the position of pro-gay rights activists. Given that
such a backlash can have positive effects, the EU should not be inhibited from exerting pressure in
the face of domestic opposition.
At first glance, gay rights would seem an area of political life largely untouched by Eastern Europe’s democratic
transition and integration into the EU. We read, for example, of Pride parade bans in Poland in 2004 and 2005,
violent attacks on parades in Hungary in 2007 and Serbia in 2010, and Lithuania’s laws against “homosexual
propaganda” in schools. It is easy to conclude that deep taboos about homosexuality – which predated but were
then amplified under communist rule – keep gay rights firmly off limits in the public sphere. If we then consider the
role of the EU in all of this, we might be tempted to see it as negligible at best and damaging at worst. Rather than
promoting liberal democratic values and minority rights in its new member states, it may seem that the EU only
inflames social prejudices. Go to observe a Gay Pride event anywhere in the region, and you will find counter-
protestors denouncing “Euro-Sodom” and cultural imperialism from Brussels.
This article argues, however, that the broader picture in post-communist Europe is one of increasingly organised
and influential gay rights movements. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Poland. Here, as elsewhere, activism
has been hindered by communism’s legacies of weak civil society and state repression of homosexuality. (In
addition, Polish activists face an unusually influential church hierarchy.) As elsewhere, activism bears the indelible
imprints of the EU. Rights groups frame demands with reference to EU norms of diversity and non-discrimination.
Likewise, gay rights opponents frame the debate in EU terms, though naturally, they construe EU norms as a threat
to national identity. Gay rights have the flavour of a European project, for better and for worse.
However, the EU’s imprints on this issue are not those we would expect from the familiar perspective of
Europeanisation theory, with its emphasis on conditionality and social learning as drivers of political change.
Conditionality explains such change in terms of adaptation to external incentives: to become an EU member, states
must adopt EU norms. We should expect change when conditionality’s leverage is maximal, i.e. before and during
accession. Yet in Poland, the biggest shifts in gay rights politics have occurred significantly after accession. Social
learning theorists, meanwhile, expect change as new member-states become persuaded of the appropriateness of
EU norms, i.e. when these norms resonate domestically. Clearly, this is not a good description of the path of gay
rights politics in Poland.
If we divide recent Polish history into pre-accession (1989-1997), accession (1998-2004), and post-accession
(2004-present) periods, we see a pattern in which EU intervention – real or threatened – reshapes the political
opportunity structure for activists, alters how homosexuality is framed, and acts as a catalyst for activist networks to
mobilise. Social movement theory offers more useful lessons here than Europeanisation theory. First, polarisation
strengthens activism. Activists become more organised when they face political backlash from the right. Second,
polarisation increases issue salience. Third, EU conditionality is of limited direct impact but, by shaping the
landscape in which social movements pursue their goals, enormous indirect impact.
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Space is too limited to describe recent Polish history in detail, but I will review a few key moments to illustrate these
arguments. In the pre-accession period, the political opportunity structure was defined by the absence of binding EU
conditionality. Gay activism did not provoke a backlash politically; in fact, it didn’t provoke any attention at all.
Homosexuality was framed in terms of Church teaching. Even regarding HIV/AIDS, the Church set the frame,
characterising AIDS patients as sufferers deserving help, but avoiding discussion of the mode of transmission. In a
sign of their weakness, even the nascent gay rights groups adopted this framing. The activist network was sparse,
uncoordinated, apolitical, and, by the late 1990s, in decline.
In 1998, the European Parliament warned that it would block the accession of any country that “through its
legislation or policies violates the human rights of lesbians and gay men.” Accession politics counterposed a new
framing of homosexuality – one of European law and human rights. The emerging framing contest mapped easily
onto a broader debate about identity that polarised Polish politics in the early 2000s — that between the upwardly
mobile, educated, urban citizens of “Poland A,” who took a secular and cosmopolitan view of national identity, and
the older, less-educated, churchgoing denizens of “Poland B.” These identified the nation with Catholicism. In 2001,
Poland B became an electoral force as the new parties Law and Justice (PiS) and the League of Polish Families
(LPR) entered politics. Gay rights soon became highly salient, as EU requirements regarding equal treatment
provoked defiant responses from Poland B’s politicians. The once moribund activist network became denser, more
professional, self-consciously political, and national in scope.
The greatest organisational development of the Polish movement has been after accession, though at first it
appeared that it was fighting for its existence. From 2005-2007, Poland experienced its most nationalist government
since 1989, key members of which made the “homosexual lobby” their target. This polarisation was nowhere more
evident than in the Pride parades. These had been small, Warsaw-based, and relatively peaceful affairs before
2004. Almost immediately after Poland’s entry into the EU, PiS leader and Warsaw mayor Lech Kaczyński banned
the city’s parade. Yet, even in the face of bans and administrative chicanery, Prides continued to be organised, and
spread to other Polish cities. Activists also fought back
in the courts, overturning the Warsaw ban in the
European Court of Human Rights.
This period of intense polarisation was punctured in
2007 when Kaczyński’s government collapsed in a
corruption scandal. New elections brought the implosion
of the far right as LPR failed to reenter parliament. For
the remaining parties of the right, one lesson has been
that anti-gay politics is not a winning electoral strategy.
Meanwhile, Poland’s recharged movement has made a
series of breakthroughs since 2007 – from being the first
post-communist country to host Europride, to electing
openly gay rights activists, first to city government and
then to parliament in October 2011.
Poland’s gay rights movement offers a new perspective
on how transnational actors like the EU can foster rights
in “difficult cases.” Poland’s experience suggests that
fears of backlash against international pressure are not
only overstated, but misunderstand the consequences
of such a backlash. Ultimately it can strengthen rights
advocacy; thus, there is an important rationale to apply
the full pressure of conditionality on applicants and new
members to live up to their minority-rights obligations.
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For a longer discussion of this topic, see the author’s
recent article in East European Politics.
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